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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILLS' ROOFING INC. , 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Responden t, 
Case No. 15346 
SALT LAKE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF BREACHED 
ITS CONTRACT WITH DEFENDANT. 
A. Reasons for Termination of Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff complains, in an effort to distract the Court 
from the real issues, that it was not aware that the Salt Lake 
Board would claim a violation of the roofing contract until 
the trial had begun. (Respondent's Brief, p. 6). This state-
ment is incorrect since the answer claimed failure to work in 
a "professional, workmanlike and expeditious manner" and ad-
missions sent to Plaintiff clearly asked it to admit or deny 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the existence of the protection and sealing requirern 
ent int: 
contract and its failure to properly perform it. (R., p, ll 
Plaintiffs are trying to disguise the real change · in positic· 
In response to the request for admissions Plaintiff 
plead that the original contract had been orally modif~. 
(R., p. 40). Likewise, the plaintiff up to the second dayo: 
trial argued that the contract had been modified by the allt 
statements of the school district employees. (Tr., pp. lS\-
159). There can be no doubt, therefore, that Plaintiff was 
well aware that Paragraph 11 in the contract was one ground 
which Defendant relied upon in dismissing Plaintiff from the 
roofing project. 
Plaintiff has characterized its dismissal from the pro· 
ject as caused solely from the failure to seal the roof. It 
is also incorrect. Throughout the trial the Salt Lake City 
School District argued that it was entitled to terminate Pll 
tiff from the project because of the company 1 s failure to ir 
perly protect the building from water damage and from its C! 
tinuous subsequent delays in both failing to prevent~ 
damage and in failing to complete the work. Exhibits 16P a: 
19P demonstrate the concern the district had as to the plai: 
tiff 1 s performance and testimony further demonstrated thi5• 
pla · Exhibit 16P is a letter dated October 30, 1974 to · 
tiff roofing corporation from Bruce F. Ririe, Director of;. 
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11: 
:c 
ings and Grounds for the Salt Lake City School District. This 
letter in pertinent part said the following: 
There was a serious roof leak on the above 
project over the weekend of October 19-21, 
1974. This was caused when the crews re-
moved the old roof and did not get a new 
one back on before the storm. The roof has 
continued leaking and causing further dam-
age with every subsequent storm during the 
last two weeks. As of this date our crews 
have had to work a total of 31 hours over-
time •••• We would encourage you to move 
as rapidly as possible to complete your 
contract. The longer the roof is left open 
the more damage will result. So far it has 
not disrupted the school program but if we 
get a heavy storm it very well could. The 
damage cost could then become substantial. 
Exhibit 19, a letter to Plaintiff roofing company by Mr. 
Ririe dated November 5 summarizes the reasons for the termina-
tion of Plaintiff from the roofing job. This letter in pertin-
ent part states the following: 
* * * 
Your crew started work the last part of Sep-
tember and completed approximately 4,000 
square feet of reroofing. They then started 
on the main building and had part of the old 
roof removed when it rained over the weekend 
of October 20. You attempted to cover over 
the roof with visqueen but this was not suc-
cessful and water damage resulted in the 
building. It was necessary to work our crews 
overtime to handle this emergency. The cost 
of this damage is now approaching an estimate 
of $2,000 including the labor charges accrued. 
You assured us that you would immediately get 
the new roof on as soon as the rain stopped. 
In fact, you quoted us the date of Saturday, 
November 2, 1974 and you intended to bring in 
a lar'~"' crew and complete the work. You later 
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assured us this would happen on Monday, No-
vember 4, 1974 for certain. 
In actual fact, what has happened is that no 
one showed up to work November 2 and on No-
v.o-illber 4, your crews came and removed their 
equipment stating the roof was too wet to 
work on and they were going to another job. 
An examination of the roof showed it to be 
dry except for one or two spots that could 
easily be dried out with a torch. 
We are very disappointed in your performance 
of this project. You were slow getting on 
the job and have only worked sporadically 
since. You have made no attempt to clean up 
the water inside the building or protect it. 
It has been necessary for our crews to do it 
all. 
We have been unable to contact you by tele-
phone on November 4 and 5. Therefore, we 
are sending you this registered letter to in-
form you that unless the new roof is installed 
where the old was torn off and the roof leaks 
caused by your crews repaired by Saturday, No-
vember 9, 1974 so there is no further water 
damage inside the building, your contract with 
us will be cancelled •••• 
If you do go ahead to complete this project 
we expect that any further work will be done 
in such a manner that there will be no fur-
ther water damage to the building or its con-
tents. 
Thus, the defendant school district did not abruptly ano 
recklessly terminate the plaintiff because of one incident in· 
valving a leaky roof. The sum total of the leaky roof, the 
· di' sruption to the edu· delays in protecting it, the continuing 
t the in:· 
cation process, the delays in completing the projec 1 
f tors resu bility to communicate with Plaintiff, and other ac 
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ted in the termination of the contract. As stated in Appel-
lant • s main brief, the Salt Lake District was not required 
to allow further damage to its building, further delay, and 
further unconventional methods of roofing to be utilized but 
had the right at that point to terminate Plaintiff and to pay 
it for its previous services. The fact that the district was 
partially paid for some of the damage incurred does not negate 
the right of the district to terminate Plaintiff from the job 
before payment and while damage was occurring daily. 
B. Determination of Breach Does Not Involve Waiver 
Question. 
Plaintiff argues that it was proper for the trial court 
to consider the issue of waiver before determining whether a 
breach had been committed. Plaintiff stated, "Thus, if the 
question of waiver is disputed, based on the evidence, that 
would ~ fortiori put the question of breach in dispute, since 
it would be disputed whether in fact at the time of the alleged 
breach there was even a clause to the contract to be breached." 
(Plaintiff's brief, p. 8) • 
This assumption is erroneous. The trial court specifi-
cally found that the parties had ~ orally modified the con-
tract. Had an oral modification of the contract been present 
then Paragraph 11, requiring protection of the building, would 
have been eliminated from consideration. However, waiver is 
nc'L tne s~rn~; ·3S modification since waiver only excuses a breach. 
-s-
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5 Willston on Contracts, Section 676, pp. 219-222. 
In the:; 
circumstances modification must precede the b 
reach while Wai· 
ver can only be made subsequent to a breach. 
Instruction No. 14, given to the J'ury (R., p • 100)' Sta· 
ted this principle as follows: 
Under ordinary circumstances where there is 
an existing actual breach of contract of a 
character going to the essence, the innocent 
party will, if he insists on performance not-
withstanding the breach, keep alive his own 
obligation to continue with performance, 
with the result that the party at fault, even 
though having in the interval done nothing 
in reliance on a continuance of performance, 
may, if he sees fit, turn about and hold the 
innocent party to performance. In other 
words, a party may waive a breach by the 
other party and then be liable for his own 
subsequent breach. 
This instruction recognizes the general principle of la• 
that waiver is a defense to a claim of breach of contract whe: 
the innocent party still seeks performance from the breachin~ 
party. Plaintiff in its brief even admits this when it state: 
"Waiver is a defense raised to Defendant-Appellant's claim 
that Plaintiff-Respondent breached its contract." (Respon· 
dent's brief, p. 10). For these reasons Plaintiff's assertia: 
that waiver was an integral part of breach is incorrect. 
f cle' Analyzing this principle in terms of burden of proo · 
Utl. lized. Pla~ ly shows the procedure which should have been 
tiff had the initial burden of showing that a contract was en 
tered into with the school district and that it had been te!'. 
-6-
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ted by the district. At that point a judgment could have been 
rendered against the district if it did not have a defense. 
The district, in its case, had the burden of proving that 
the termination was excused because Plaintiff had breached its 
contract to perform work in a workmanlike manner and in accor-
dance to the requirements of the contract. If the district 
could sustain its burden and show that an actual breach had 
occurred then judgment for the defendant could be made as a 
matter of law. In this case it was undisputed and conceded 
that the roof was not sealed, that the work was not done during 
the two-week interval of the rainstorms, and that the building 
was damaged as a result of the actions of Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff at this point had to show that the district's 
excuse was itself excused. The party claiming a waiver has 
the burden of proof of the facts on which he relies to establish 
such waiver and unless such proof is forthcoming he cannot sus-
tain his claim to it. 28 Am. Jur.2d, Estoppel and Waiver, §173, 
P· 861. It was thus incumbent upon the plaintiff in rebuttal 
to show that the agents had expressed, implied, or apparent au-
thority to make a waiver and that the elements of waiver were 
present--thereby excusing any breach the district was claiming. 
Unfortunately, the trial did not proceed in this orderly 
manner but testimony as to waiver, agency, breach, and damages 
was mingled throughout both the plaintiff's and defendant's ca-
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.. 
ses. This confusion is seen most markedl · th Y in e outcome :: 
the instructions to the J·ury, the special i.· t n errogatories, 
and the failure of the trial court to rule as t a ma ter of :,. 
For these reasons, the trial court erred in not rulir.; 
matter of law that a breach of contract had occurred by t~:. 
duct of Plaintiff and erred further in submitting this ques:. 
to the jury with incomplete and erroneous instructions. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED PLAIN-
TIFF'S CLAIM OF WAIVER TO BE PRESENTED BE-
FORE THE JURY AND ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY. 
A. There is a Substantial Difference Between Waiver o: 
Modification. 
Plaintiff claimed in its brief that it was under no oL 
gation to plead or give notice of the claimed waiver of Par:-
graph 11. (Respondent's brief, pp. 9-10) • Utah is a notice· 
pleading state and the parties to a lawsuit are entitled tc i: 
the theories of the adversary before entering the courtroo::. 
That is especially true here where pre-trial discovery rei;-;e:· 
Plaintiff to disclose its legal theories; but Plaintiff, at:-
suggestion of the Judge, changed its theory on the second dr 
of trial. 
Defendant's answer setting forth the affirmative defe~;; 
that the work was not done according to the specificaticns:.: 
t · "e '.'.' 
in a workmanlike manner clearly put Plaintiff upon no- 1" 
-8-
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~his was the justification for the termination of the contract. 
At that point Plaintiff could have filed a reply to Defendant• s 
answer, by leave court, under Rule 7, U.R.C.P. and thus raised 
waiver as a defense -co Defendant's affirmative defense. Panson 
v. Pappas, 206 P. 261 (Utah 1922). 
More importantly, it is evident that waiver was never con-
templated by the plaintiff at any time until the second day of 
trial since in Plaintiff's response to Defendant's Requests for 
Admissions the following question and answer was given: 
1. That the contract between the plaintiff 
and the defendant require that at the end of 
each working day the roof would be sealed to 
prevent water damage to the building and its 
contents. 
Response: 
Denied. The written contract was later modi-
fied by an oral contract between the parties. 
(R., p. 40). 
Likewise, Plaintiff's counsel argued modification of the con-
tract in the first portion of the trial but this theory was re-
jected by the trial court. (Tr., pp. 305-306). The concept of 
waiver was first presented by the Judge himself. (Tr., pp. 159-
160) • 
The sudden emergence of the "waiver" theory midway through 
trial no doubt accounts to a large extent for the confusion 
that was present in the presentation of evidence and in the in-
stnctions to the jury. Neither side submitted jury instruc-
-9-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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tions to the court containing these elements of a gency or wa_ 
ver. 
There is obviously a world of difference between 
a modi-
fication of a contract and a waiver of terms in 
an existing 
contract. In the first instance, the burden is 
upon the plat: 
tiff to show the creation of the modified contract and P 
resu-
mably if the contract is thus shown the plaintiff will prevai. 
The defendant, in such a case, can only argue that such a cor.· 
tract was not made, and presumably will prevail if he can con-
vince the court or jury of the non-existence of the rnodificat: 
Waiver, on the other hand, involves a showing by the pk 
tiff of the original contract, a claim by the defendant that 
the original contract had been breached, and the response by 
the plaintiff that the defendant waived any claim to assert 
such a breach. The elements going to an oral modification of 
a written contract are likewise completely different from the 
elements necessary for a waiver of an existing contract--sucr. 
as the necessity for new consideration when modification is ai. 
leged. Wood v. Brighton Mills, 297 F. 594, 600 (3rd Cir. l91i 
This Court in Phoenix Insurance Company v. Heath, 6l pJ 
308 (Utah 1936} defined waiver as an intentional relinquish· 
ment of known rights, and stated that to constitute a waiver 
]<nowli: 
there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, 
· t which i' 
of existence thereof, and intention to relinquish 1 
-10-
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distinctly made. 
In order for a plaintiff to show a waiver of a contractual 
provision it is necessary to show an intentional relinquislunent 
of a known right. Phoenix Insurance Company v. Heath, 61 P.2d 
308 (Utah 1936); Bjark v. April Industries Inc., 547 P.2d 219 
(Utah 1976). 
It is crucial that knowledge and intention of the waiver 
be shown and proved by the party claiming it. The general 
rule is as follows: 
It must generally be shown by the party claim-
ing a waiver that the person against whom the 
waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, 
actual or constructive, of the existence of 
his rights or of all the material facts upon 
which they depended. No man can be bound by a 
waiver of his rights unless such waiver is dis-
tinctly made, with full knowledge of the rights 
which he intends to waive; and the fact that he 
knows his rights and intends to waive them 
must plainly appear. Ignorance of a material 
fact negatives waiver, and waiver cannot be es-
tablished by a consent given under a mistake 
or misapprehension of facts. Waiver presup-
poses a full knowledge of an existing right or 
privilege and something done designedly or know-
ingly to relinquish it. 28 Am.Jur., Estoppel 
and Waiver, Section 158, p. 841: 17A C.J.S., 
Contracts, §492(1), p. 696. 
It is also fundamental that a waiver of a right or privilege is 
not presumed from mere silence alone. Id. at p. 697. There 
is no presumption that a waiver has occurred, and courts use 
every reasonable intendment against the finding of waiver. At-
~tic Ref. Co, v, Wyoming Nat. Bank, 51 A.2d 719 (Penn. 1947) • 
-11-
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B. Insufficiency of Evidence Showing Waiver. 
Waiver was not an appropriate theory for this 
case. The 
elements necessary to show waiver were not present · in this 
case even viewing the evidence most favorably to Plaintiff. 
Paragraph 11 of the contract is entitled, "Protection o: 
Building from Water Damage". Plaintiff in its brief apparent. 
argues that the agents of Defendant school district waived sv 
-· 
protection and that any damage resulting to the building coul: 
not be chargeable to the roofing company. This assumption is 
clearly unsupportable. 
Reviewing the testimony cited by Plaintiff in its brief 
concerning the covering and sealing of the roof, shows that a: 
the most the agents of Defendant agreed to open up larger m 
of the roofing surface on the assumption that visqueen would: 
used to protect the building. (Respondent's brief, pp. H 1• 
Mr. Jensen, Defendant's building inspector, testified t'.: 
told Plaintiff's employees it was their responsibility to pre: 
the building and denied that he ever gave approval to use vis: 
but stated that he would have to consult Mr. Ririe to determ: 
whether this would be possible. (Respondent's brief, P· SJ. 
Even if Jensen's testimony was completely disbelieved ar: 
the favorable testimony given by the plaintiff's witnesses 10 
fully believed there is still no showing of a knowledgeable< 
ver. In each instance quoted by Respondent the tearing up c' 
rct: 
large areas was conditioned upon the use of visqueen to P 
the building. 
cc 
Plaintiff assured Defendant's agent that " 
-12-
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queen would prevent damage--Plaintiff was the expert and Defen-
dant justifiably relied upon its expertise in acquiescing to 
the new procedure. If there was a waiver it was made under 
a "mistake or misapprehension of facts" that visqueen would 
protect the building even if it was not sealed in the customary 
manner. 
Ken Bills stated that he was never told by anyone in De-
fendant's employment that the company was not responsible for 
preventing water from entering the building. (Tr., p. 192). 
Russell Bills testified he considered it his responsibility to 
prevent water damage to the building and that it was a neces-
sary workmanlike procedure to protect the building. (Tr., p. 
101). All of Plaintiff's witnesses agreed that they had to, 
in some way, protect the building. 
It therefore can hardly be said that Defendant's agents, 
even assuming they had such authority, knowingly waived their 
right to insist that the building be protected from water damage, 
and, at the most, agreed to allow a new procedure in which the 
roof would not be done in small areas and sealed each night but 
would be done in large areas with visqueen on hand to seal the 
roof when necessary. 
Likewise, the conduct of Defendants in writing the letters 
previously referred to as Exhibits 16 and 19 show the clear in-
tent of Defendant in holding Plaintiff responsible for both the 
water r13~- ~ • d ·~ ""''""' tnat had already occurred, for future water am-
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
age, and for delay. 
In Waterway Terminals Co. v. P.S. Lord Mechanical Co 
---...!.' 
406 P.2d 556 (Or. 1965) it was claimed that an owner 
of a sf,: 
waived his right to insist that a contractor provi'de insuran:, 
on it. The court in that case looked upon the intent of the 
owner and held that he did not ever intend to release his rfo 
to receive damages from fire simply because he tried to obta:· 
other insurance policies. The court in that case quoted a pr; 
vious Oregon Supreme Court case which stated the rule as fol· 
lows: 
••• (I]n the absence of an express agree-
ment a waiver will not be presumed or im-
plied contrary to the intention of the par-
ties whose rights would be injuriously af-
fected thereby, unless by his conduct the 
opposite party has been mislead, to his 
prejudice, into the honest belief that such 
waiver was intended or consented to. To 
make out a case of waiver of a legal right 
there must be a clear, unequivocal, and 
decisive act of the party showing such a 
purpose or act amounting to estoppel on his 
part.. • • Id. at 568. 
Obviously, none of the parties in this action ever consi· 
dered the school district to have waived the requirement that 
Plaintiff protect the building from water damage. Plaintiff" 
d 
own employees admitted this fact, the letters from the boar· 
education substantiated it further, and the efforts of Plain~: 
Showed that Plaint:: to correct the water problem conclusively 
was responsible for the damage. 
-14-
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Thu~ Plaintiff did not change its position in any way 
in reliance upon the alleged statements made by the employees 
of the school district. It obviously did not change its posi-
tion with reference to what it considered to be its obligation 
to prevent water damage to the building and its contents. 
what actually occurred was that the plaintiff was ineffective 
in accomplishing its responsibility. The submission of In-
struction 14, in speaking in terms of "estoppel", was clearly 
unjustified and erroneous. 
There was never any testimony or evidence showing that 
the alleged approval by Mr. Jensen or Mr. Ririe was made with 
the knowledge that the visqueen plastic would not protect the 
building from damage. Plaintiff was supposed to be the roofing 
expert. Even under the doctrine of apparent or ostensible au-
thority it cannot be said that an agent's power goes beyond 
what is usual or necessary as ordinary administrative duties 
and an act which is adverse to the interest of the principal 
and which will not benefit him is clearly outside of any such 
authority. McConner v. Dickson, 233 P.2d 877 (Wyo. 1951). 
For the agents of Defendant to have waived the requirement 
of Rrotectin~ the building would clearly have been adverse to 
the interest of the school district and even if they had inten-
ded to do so there was obviously no authority either apparent 
or implied. 
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Thus, there was no sufficient evidence showing 
waiver ,, 
Paragraph 11 or the requirement that the job be done e.xpedj. 
tiously in a workmanlike manner to submit to the J'ury. Ther, 
was no conflicting evidence negating the fact that the buiJ;. 
ing was not protected and continued to be damaged during the 
two-week period. 
For this reason, the court should have ruled as a matte; 
of law that no waiver was present and should have entered a 
verdict in favor of Defendant. Instead, the issue of waiver 
was submitted to the jury in Instruction No. 14 with no gui· 
dance as to the definition of waiver (including its essentia: 
elements) or no instruction that the agent had to have expre< 
implied, or apparent authority. To confuse the jury even fur· 
ther, no interrogatory as to waiver was asked--only as to br: 
Additionally, the court's failure to rule as a matter o'. 
law that waiver was not present in this case was clearly em· 
neous. 
CONCLUSION 
This case involves extremely diff.icult legal concepts of 
breach, waiver, authority, and burden of proof. Admittedly, 
d ·ff· lt for lawyers and J. udges to thorc~­these concepts are i icu 
;mpossible task bef:: ly understand--this is why a jury has an ~ .. 
issues and t: it when the court fails to sift the unnecessary 
allow the whole conglomeration to fall into the jury's iw· 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with no instructions as to how to solve the problem. 
Here, the trial court submitted the question of Plain-
tiff's breach to the jury when no factual question existed. 
The building wasn't protected, the damage wasn't stopped, and 
therefore the plaintiff unequivocally breached its obligation 
of protection of the building and performing in a worlananlike 
manner. 
Here, the trial court submitted the question of waiver to 
the jury when there was absolutely no evidence that Defendant's 
agents had any authority to waive any contract provision and 
where the elements of waiver were not ever met. How can Plain-
tiff claim that Defendant's agents waived protection of the 
building from damage when the testimony cited by Plaintiff in 
its brief always was conditioned on the presence of visqueen? 
Even if it is assumed arguendo that a jury issue was pre-
sent the poor and incomplete instructions given to the jury 
on the elements of waiver, the complete absence of any instruc-
tion as to authority, and the failure to submit interrogatories 
concerning authority and waiver constituted a final error. 
Much of this confusion is traceable to the failure of 
Plaintiff to give proper notice of his theory of the case. But 
since the trial judge himself suggested the theory to Plain-
tiff's counsel during the second day of trial, it is easy to 
see why such notice wasn't given. Defendant was denied the 
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chance to properly present its case because of this untimely 
change in theories. 
For these reasons this Court should enter judgment in fa. 
vor of Defendant, or, in the alternative, order a new trial, . 
TIM DALTON DUNN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Of Counsel 
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